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Abstract 
There is an increasing need to be able to classify 
whether an incoming packet is from a legitimate originating 
IP address or has been modified through an intermediate 
proxy or node. Being able to verify the originating IP 
address allows a business (e.g. bank) to use geolocation 
services in order to then ascertain which geographical 
location that packet was sent from. This can then feed into 
the system intrusion system or backend fraud alert 
mechanisms. The web however is going 'dark'. There is a 
noticeable uptake in the amount of encrypted data and third 
party anonymous traffic proxies which aim to mask the try 
location and IP address of a web request. We present here a 
system which identifies the characteristics or signatures 
whenever a user is using a web proxy by developing a 
Detection System that records packets and analyses them 
looking for identifying patterns of web proxies.  
1. Introduction
     A proxy server, in  terms of computer networks, is a 
server that acts as an intermediary for requests from 
clients for resources located on other servers on a 
network or the Internet. This is the most basic type of 
proxy  which is known as a gateway. Another type of 
proxy  is a reverse proxy. This consists of a server on 
an internal company network and acts as an 
intermediary  for other servers based on that network. 
Reverse proxies are typically used as an Internet 
facing server that handles a number of different tasks. 
Some examples include: SSL acceleration using 
specially designed hardware for the encryption and 
decryption of SSL traffic, load balancing to distribute 
requests between several web servers and acting as a 
cache for static content such as pictures and other 
graphical content. The proxies that will be discussed 
in this research are anonymising proxies which are 
based on another type of proxy known as an open 
proxy. Open proxies are a p roxy that is available to 
any user on the Internet. They are mostly used to set 
up anonymous proxy websites. Anonymising proxy  
sites act as an intermediary, forwarding requests and 
fetching the results, whilst also hid ing a user’s identity 
by concealing their IP address from web servers on the 
Internet. This type of server is regularly used as a 
means to hide a criminal’s identity so they can commit  
various crimes on the internet without being caught. 
There are also a number of risks with using an 
anonymous proxy as a method to bypass network 
filters on a company network.  The anonymous proxy  
server might not be a simple intermediary  that only 
forwards requests and fetches the results. It could also  
be logging all the requests and information that pass 
through it. This information could  include usernames 
and passwords and the operators of the proxy site may  
use these to steal the identity linked to the credentials 
and use it to commit fraud and other criminal actions. 
A user employing an anonymous proxy on an 
enterprise network to bypass a network filter might be, 
unwittingly, leaking confidential information about 
their company. To combat this issue we propose a 
system that will detect suspicious traffic on the 
network and attempt to determine whether the traffic 
indicates the usage of an anonymous proxy website. 
The system will specifically check for characteristics 
that appear in packets generated by anonymous 
proxies and then create ru les to determine the usage of 
anonymous proxies. 
2. Intrusion Detection and Traffic
Classification 
2.1. IP Blocking 
IP b locking is the most basic technique used to 
combat malicious threats to networks and is one of the 
most commonly  used techniques for protecting 
networks [1]. Using this method an administrator can 
block an IP address or a range of IP address es from 
accessing a certain domain name IP address. A 
network admin istrator can also block access to an IP 
address that is being used by a disruptive user. IP 
blocking can however be overcome by using 
anonymising proxies. The user’s IP address is usually 
sent out as a source IP address in the network packet  
containing the request to a web server. However, 
when using a proxy, this request is first sent to the 
proxy server which then forwards it on towards the 
web server. This forwarded request is encased in a 
new network packet which means that the source IP 
address is no longer that of the end user but instead is 
that of the proxy server. So, the blocked IP address of 
the user is not actually making any direct contact with 
the web server running the IP filter. The network 
administrator may also block the IP addresses of 
websites that they do not want users to access, but in 
this case a proxy will separate the business network 
and the website being accessed. The IP block filter 
will only detect the IP of the proxy site, which will 
likely not be in the filter’s block list. Fig . 1 shows how 
the proxy is located between the user and the website 
they are trying to access. 
International Journal for Information Security Research (IJISR), Volume 5, Issue 1, March 2015
Copyright © 2015, Infonomics Society 538
2.2. Firewalls and Intrusion Detection 
 
A significant security problem for business type 
networks is hostile or unwanted access by users or 
software [2]. Unwanted user access (an intrusion) can 
be in the form of unauthorised logon to a machine or 
gaining the ability to perform h igher priv ilege act ions 
than what is normally authorised. Unwanted software 
access can take the form of a v irus, Tro jan horse or 
other form of malware. To combat these intrusions 
there are a number o f defences. There are host based 
security methods that are managed by the operating 
system of the machine, various types of firewall used 
to filter network packets, such as Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS).  
A firewall is defined as a component or set of 
components that restrict access between a protected 
network and external networks [3]. Intrusion 
Detection Systems detect intrusions on a network. 
IDSs come in many d ifferent configurations, two of 
which are Host-based IDS (HIDS) and Network-based 
IDS (NIDS). The d ifference between these two is the 
location of the IDS on the network. A HIDS monitors 
and collects the characteristics for hosts containing 
sensitive information, servers running public services 
and suspicious activities  [4]. To detect intrusions to 
the network HIDSs typically follow one of two  
general approaches. These are anomaly detection and 
signature detection. Anomaly detection involves the 
collection of data relat ing to behaviour of leg itimate 
users over a period of time. Next, tests are applied to 
observed behaviour to determine if it involves an 
illegit imate user. Signature detection involves a set of 
rules or attack patterns that can be used to decide if an  
observed behaviour is that of an attacker [4]. A NIDS 
captures network traffic at specific points of a network 
through sensors and then analyses the activities of 
applications and protocols to recognise suspicious 
incidents [4]. A typical NIDS configuration includes a 
number of sensors to monitor network traffic, a NIDS 
management server and one or more user interface 
consoles for human interaction with the IDS. The 
analysis of network traffic may occur at  either the 
sensor and/or the management server. As with HIDSs, 
NIDSs make use of both anomaly detection and 
signature detection [4]. 
 
2.3. Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
Systems 
 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring 
connections coming to and leaving from a computer or 
network and then analysing those connections for 
signs of potential violations or incidents that go 
against security and acceptable use policies [5].Causes 
of these incidents can include attackers gaining 
unauthorised access to systems, malware such as 
spyware and Trojan viruses and misuse of system 
privileges by users or attempts to gain additional 
privileges. An intrusion detection system is the 
software that automates this process. An intrusion 
prevention system has all the same capabilities of an 
intrusion detection system and also has the capability 
of preventing possible violations [6]. When detecting 
possible incidents, an IDS can take a number of 
actions. One would be to report the incident to a 
system security administrator, who could then init iate 
a response to mitigate the effects of the incident. 
Alongside alerting an admin istrator, the IDS could  
also keep a record  of incident that could be referenced 
at a later date and as a way to help prevent future 
cases of that particular incident. There are a number of 
different types of IDS. These are: Network based, 
Host based, Network Behaviour and Wireless [5]. 
Network based systems monitor the traffic of a  
network using sensors placed at certain parts of the 
network and IDS management servers. They analyse 
the activity recorded by the sensors in order to identify  
incidents of intrusion. Host based systems differ from 
network based systems by monitoring a single host. 
NBA systems monitor network traffic in order to 
identity threats that generate unusual traffic flows such 
as malware or port scanning attempts. Wireless IDSs 
apply similar techniques to network based systems 
specifically to wireless network traffic that makes use 
of wireless networking protocols. IDSs typically  use 3 
primary detection methodologies; signature based 
detection, anomaly based detection and stateful 
protocol analysis [7, 4]. IDSs can make use of only  
one of these methods or, more commonly, they can 
make use of multip le methods which provides a 
broader and more complete approach to intrusion 
detection. Signature based detection is the process of 
using signatures to define what is and is not a potential 
incident. Signatures are defined as a pattern or string 
that signifies a known attack or threat [4]. An example 
of a signature would be more than 3 consecutive failed  
logins within 2 minutes signifying an attack attempt. 
Signature based detection is the simplest methodology 
available to IDSs as it compares the current network 
packets or network logs against a list of signatures and 
patterns using string comparison techniques [8]. 
Scanning network packets would be useful for an  
online, real time detection system whereas scanning 
network logs would be more suitable in finding out if 
an attack had taken  place in the past. A limitation of 
signature based detection is that they are limited to the 
informat ion that they were trained on. This means that 
new types of attack or an attacks that use intrusion 
detection evasion techniques may not be identified [4, 
9]. If a certain type of malware has a signature that is 
based on the name of a file included as an attachment 
in an email, then a simple way to evade signature 
detection is to change the name of the file.  
Anomaly based detection is the process of 
comparing the known behaviours of the network 
against observed events in the same network to 
identify significant deviations. An anomaly is defined 
as a deviation to a known or normal behaviour. 
Profiles are used to represent the normal or expected 
behaviours derived [4]. These profiles are typically  
generated over a period of days or weeks and will 
contain statistical data of system activities such as 
CPU usage. The profile that results can then be either 
a static profile of the system or network or a dynamic 
profile. Static profiles remain unchanged until there is 
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a need to change them, in which case the system is 
instructed to generate a new profile of the system or 
network. A dynamic profile is updated regularly as 
new events are observed on the network [5]. Anomaly  
based detection tends to be effective in detecting new 
types of incidents or attacks but there are a number of 
drawbacks as well. For an accurate normal profile to 
be generated, a lot of time must be invested otherwise 
the profile will be inaccurate and will trigger false 
alerts [10]. These will mostly be in the form of false 
positives where the system reports an incident that is 
part of the legitimate network act ivity. This can lead 
on to the system mistaking actual incidents for normal 
activity, also known as false negatives. Stateful 
protocol analysis is similar to anomaly based detection 
in that it compares predetermined profiles against 
observed network activity to identify deviations. The 
profiles used are where there are differences. Unlike in  
anomaly  based detection, stateful protocol analysis 
makes use of universal profiles that define how 
particular protocols are expected to behave in normal 
everyday operations [5]. These profiles are based 
primarily on protocol standard developed by software 
development companies and standards bodies. By  
comparing observed traffic against these profiles, 
stateful protocol analysis can identify unexpected 
utilisations of protocols that may indicate an  attack. 
However, companies regularly modify protocols to 
suit their own needs and sometimes fail to document 
or detail the changes made. This makes it difficu lt for 
stateful protocol analysis IDSs to perform a complete 
analysis unless the protocol profile is updated. The 
main d isadvantage to stateful protocol analysis though, 
is that it is a very resource intensive task because of 
the complexity of the analysis performed and the 
process of tracking the state of a protocol [5]. To  
combat the deficiencies of the different detection 
methods, most IDSs make use of multip le methods. 
Signature based and Anomaly based detection are 
complementary methods as they both address the 
short-comings of the other [4]. 
 
2.4. Intrusion Detection Systems with Machine 
Learning 
 
     Integrating machine learning techniques into 
intrusion detection systems is seen as a way to 
increase the ability and accuracy of the detection 
system. These techniques include various kinds of 
artificial neural networks and classification techniques 
such as genetic algorithms and fuzzy logic. There has 
been various research studies looking into integrating 
machine learning into IDSs with the recent trend being 
in improving the machine learning aspect by 
combin ing different techniques to increase detection 
accuracy and to decrease the computational effort 
required to train the systems. [8] proposed a feature 
representation technique using a combination of the 
cluster centre and nearest neighbour approaches. 
Experiments that were carried out made use of the 
KDD-Cup99
1
 dataset and showed that the approach 
                                                 
1 http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html 
required less computational effort to  provide similar 
levels of accuracy to k-NN. [11] proposed a mult iple 
level hybrid classifier that combined supervised tree 
classifiers with unsupervised Bayesian clustering. 
Performance of this approach was also measured using 
the KDD-Cup99 dataset and experiments showed that 
it provided a low false negative rate of 3.23% and a 
false positive rate of 3.2% with a high detection rate 
for both known and unknown attacks. [12] made use 
of a Support Vector Machine (SVM) for classificat ion 
and a clustering tree technique called Dynamically  
Growing Self-Organising Tree (DGSOT) to improve 
the training times of the SVM. Experiments were 
carried out using the DARPA98
2
 dataset and showed 
that using a clustering tree helped to increase the 
accuracy rate of the SVM and lower the rates of false 
positives and false negatives. [13] provided a system 
that made use of both genetic algorithms and fuzzy  
logic to  create a genetic fuzzy  classifier to predict  
different behaviours in networked computers. The ir 
results showed that there was a benefit to using fuzzy  
logic to pre-screen rules before classifying with the 
genetic algorithm as it  decreased the time needed to 
train the system. However the systems accuracy in  
detection did not show much increase and actually  
showed a decrease in accuracy in some classes 
compared to other approaches. An earlier study used 3 
different anomaly detection techniques for classifying 
program behaviour [14]. These techniques were an 
equality matching algorithm for determin ing what was 
and wasn’t anomalous behaviour, a feed forward  
backpropagation neural network for learning the 
program behaviour and the third being a recurrent 
neural network called an Elman network for 
recognising recurrent features of program behaviour. 
Their study showed that the performance of intrusion 
detection benefited greatly from the use of the 
backpropagation network and the Elman  network. The 
general consensus that can be gathered from these 
studies is that the use of machine learning techniques 
does improve the accuracy and performance of 
intrusion detection systems. 
 
2.5  Proxies 
 
Anonymous web proxies come in many d ifferent 
forms. Some proxy scripts are produced using PHP 
based or CGI (Common Gateway Interface) based 
scripts. The reasoning behind the use of these 
technologies is that they both provide the functionality 
that an anonymous proxy requires and they are 
compatible with both UNIX-like and Windows hosts. 
To access the anonymous proxy a user client needs to 
connect to the proxy server first. From there, they are 
then able to send a request to the website 
anonymously. The proxy script takes the clients 
request and issues its own request to the destination 
website, receives the data back and forwards it on to 
the client. This is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
                                                 
2 https://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/ 
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Web ServerClient Proxy Server
 
Figure 1. Proxy connection 
 
Glype is a PHP based script and is one of the most 
common and popular web proxy scripts available on 
the internet. This is due to its support for content like 
JavaScript and to its ease of set up and use. To set up a 
Glype proxy server, a user must download the proxy 
files from the Glype website and then relocate the files 
to the correct directories on their webserver. Another 
option would be to use one of the many existing proxy  
sites already availab le. The Glype website provides a 
list of working proxy servers whose admin istrators 
have paid to have their site listed in the hope of 
increasing the popularity of their own server. At the 
time of writing this list contained 3,389 un ique servers. 
This list, however only  represents those that have paid 
to have better exposure; there are possibly many more 
Glype proxy servers. This presents a problem when 
trying to block access to these proxies because there 
are so many. This makes it d ifficu lt to compile a 
complete list to add to an IP block list or ACL. In  
addition, because it is so easy to set up the proxy, new 
servers are being added all the time. URL filtering will 
not work either as the majority of proxy servers based 
on the Glype script will have some form of URL 
obfuscation available. The most popular methods of 
obfuscation are encoding the URL using either base64 
or ROT-13 encoding. Other methods of encoding exist, 
but these are the main ones used by the Glype script. 
The CGIProxy is a Common Gateway Interface 
(CGI) script that acts as a HTTP, HTTPS or FTP 
proxy. CGI scripts can be programmed in  a number of 
different languages. CGIProxy is programmed using 
the interpreted language Perl. While Glype proxies 
enable URL obfuscation by default, the CGIProxy  
script does not. ROT13 encoding can be enabled by 
removing the line comments for the methods 
proxy_encode() and proxy_decode() in the script. The 
script also provides support for custom encoding code 
to be added such as hexadecimal encoding. 
 
2.6. SSL/TLS 
 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and its successor 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) are security protocols 
for establishing an encrypted link between a server 
and a client, for example, a website server and a user’s 
browser (Dig icert, 2014). SSL and TLS operate on top 
of TCP allowing protocols on higher layers of the 
network stack, such as HTTP, to be left unchanged 
while still providing a secure connection. Underneath 
the SSL layer, HTTP is identical to HTTPS. After 
building the TCP connection, the client starts the SSL 
handshake with the server. The handshake protocol is 
where the client and server agree on a protocol version, 
select cryptographic algorithms and authenticate each 
other [15]. After the handshake is established, the 
server will send its certificate to the client. This 
certificate is used to verify the server’s identity by the 
client. The certificate must be trusted by the client or 
by a party that the client trusts in order for the identity 
of the server to be verified. Once the certificate has 
been verified, a key, most likely a public key, may be 
exchanged depending on the cryptographic algorithm 
that the client and server agreed upon. Both the client 
and server compute a key  for the symmetric 
encryption session and the client tells the server that 
all communication will be encrypted going forward. 
The client sends an encrypted and authenticated 
message to the server which then verifies that the 
message can be correctly decrypted and sends an 
encrypted message in response. The connection is now 
secure and both parties  can communicate securely. Fig.  
2 shows the interaction between client and server as 
the handshake process progresses. 
 
Client Server
Client connects to server
Server connects to Client
Server sends certificate
Server requests Client certificate
Client sends certificate
and verifies server certificate
Client generates a cryptographic
key
Server verifies key
Handshake established
 
Figure 2. SSL/TLS Handshake protocol 
 
 Any attackers that may be eavesdropping on the 
connection at this point will not be able to see any of 
the encrypted message contents apart from perhaps the 
source and destination IP addresses, the ports being 
connected to and what encryption scheme is being 
used. SSL orig inated as a method for setting up and 
maintaining encrypted communications on the internet. 
It was designed to be platform independent and to be a 
generic transport layer mechanis m, but the internet 
remains as its main user [16].  The most recent 
incarnation of SSL was 3.0 which  was released in  
1996 and was published by IETF in RFC [15]. TLS 
1.0 was then defined in RFC 2246 in 1999 as an 
upgrade to SSL 3.0 [17] and included a mechanism 
which allows a TLS imple mentation to downgrade 
down to SSL 3.0 again for compatib ility reasons. TLS 
is, at the time of writ ing, on version 1.2 [18] with 
version 1.3 being drafted and not fully defined yet. 
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2.7. The Onion router 
 
Tor is a circuit-based low latency anonymous 
communicat ion service that is based on the onion 
routing principles the Naval Research Laboratory 
[19][20]. It was in itially released as a method for 
anonymous and secure communicat ion with the goal 
of allowing military personnel to work online 
undercover, but was later released to the general 
public. It is now maintained by a group of volunteers 
called The Tor Project. In the first version of onion 
routing, instead of making a direct connection to a 
web server from a client machine, applications on the 
client side make connections through a sequence of 
machines called on ion routers  [19]. Th is network of 
onion routers allows the connection between the 
initiator and responder to remain  anonymous. The 
network is accessed through a series of proxies 
starting with a socket connection from a client 
application to an application proxy. This proxy  
manipulates the connection format and changes it to a 
generic form that can be passed through the onion 
routing network. It then connects to an onion proxy, 
which is the part of the network that defines the route 
through the network by constructing a layered data 
structure called an  onion. Th is structure is then passed 
to the first onion router. An onion router that receives 
an onion peels off a layer of the onion structure, 
identifies the next router in  the sequence and sends the 
embedded onion to that router until the last layer is 
removed and the data is sent to the end point of the 
sequence. Before sending data over this connection, 
the onion proxy  adds a layer of encryption for each 
onion router present in the route. As data moves 
through the connection each onion router removes one 
layer of encryption along with a layer of the onion 
structure so it arrives as plaintext. On the way back 
through the connection, the layers of the onion 
structure are added back on along with the 
corresponding layers of encryption [19]. The Tor 
project is known as the second generation Onion 
Routing system  [20]. Tor was released to address 
limitat ions in the original onion routing design by 
adding a number of features that would improve the 
operation of the system. The b iggest difference 
between the two is that Tor runs on the live Internet, 
whereas the original design was mostly operated on a 
single machine as a proof-of-concept. 
 
2.8. MiTM attacks, ARP Spoofing 
 
One method that can be used to intercept 
communicat ions between two parties is ARP Spoofing 
(also known as ARP Poisoning). ARP spoofing occurs 
when an attacker, who is on the same Local Area 
Network (LAN) as an end user, sends fake Address 
Resolution Protocol messages to that user’s computer 
[21]. These messages are sent to convince the user’s 
computer that the attacker’s medium access control 
(MAC) address is the MAC address of, for example, 
the gateway router of that network. This interception 
of communicat ions makes use of a weakness in the 
ARP protocol which does not have any means to 
check and verify the identities of machines using it 
[22]. Through ARP spoofing, an attacker can then 
move on to perform what is known as a Man in the 
Middle (MitM) attack. Fig. 3 shows a typical layout 
for a MitM attack. 
 
Web ServerVictim
Attacker
MitM Connection
Original Connection 
 
Figure 3. A typical Man in the Middle layout 
 
This attack is a common way to interfere with  
communicat ions between two parties. To  execute a 
MitM attack, an attacker sets up a form of ARP spoof 
between two parties that are attempting to 
communicate with each other. The attacker will then 
create two simultaneous connections, one to each of 
the connected parties, and impersonate both parties at 
the ends of both connections. The two communicat ing 
parties view the connection as if they were actually  
connected directly, not noticing that the connection is 
being intercepted. Once connected, the attacker has 
access to network traffic flowing in both direct ions 
and can begin to sniff the connections for valuable 
informat ion, such as bank details or website 
credentials, or modify the data being transmitted to 
include malicious code. 
 
2.9. Commercial Detection Solutions 
 
There are a number of commercial solutions 
available currently for the detection and blocking of 
anonymous proxy usage. A number of examples and a 
comparison of what methods they use for detecting 
proxies and other capabilities they have is presented in 
table 1. The methods include URL filters, IP Filters , 
Packet Analysis, SSL Detection, HTTP Header Filters, 
Adaptive Rule Defin ition, Pre-defined Rules and IP 
Geolocation. CIPAFilter is an enterprise level solution 
intended for use by schools. It is based on either a 
desktop server, a rack mounted server or as a virtual 
server. It captures network traffic by forcing students 
to connect to the internet through the server, with the 
server acting as a forward ing proxy. It then compares 
URLs of websites visited with a list of known 
anonymising proxy websites and then blocks the 
communicat ion. The problem with th is approach is 
that the list of anonymising proxies is changing all the 
time. As proxy sites are blocked, new sites are set up 
to replace them so a lot of time and effort needs to be 
expended in making sure that the URL lists are up to 
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date. Exinda is very similar to the CIPAFilter solution, 
also making use of a list of proxy websites and is also 
based on rack mounted servers of varying capabilities.  
IP2Proxy  uses a different technique for spotting 
anonymous proxy traffic. Instead of keeping a list of 
proxy websites, it analyses network packets and looks 
for the HTTP header HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR. 
Whenever a proxy is tasked with forwarding traffic 
without masking the identity of the original client, 
then they will include this header and the IP address of 
the original machine. However this is an optional 
header and many anonymising proxies opt to not 
include it in any forwarded requests in order to hide 
the identity of the client. The Glype proxy script even 
allows for fake information to be provided, including 
showing what operating system and browser the user 
is using, to further throw off trackers. Snort  is a  
popular packet capture and intrusion detection 
application that is compatible with both Windows and 
Linux operating systems. It can run in one of three 
modes: Packet Sniffer, Packet logger or Network 
Intrusion Detection System. When running as an 
intrusion detection system, Snort detects and analyses 
suspicious traffic based on pre-defined rules. It comes 
with a default set of rules to allow users to get snort 
set up and working in itially and it also allows users to 
define and add their own ru les. Rules for detecting the 
usage of proxy websites based on PHP and CGI 
scripts were defined by John Brozycki that can be 
used to instantly send an alert whenever proxy t raffic 
is detected or, in the hands of more advanced users of 
snort, even block proxy traffic [23].  
 
Table 1. Comparison of related applications 
 
 
 
MAXMIND offers a proxy  detection service on top of 
their geo location and fraud prevention services. It  
involves passing an IP address to one of their data 
centres where the address is compared  against a list of 
IP addresses suspected of being an anonymous  proxy. 
This however runs into the same problem as using a 
URL list.  ModSecurity is an open source, cross 
platform compatible, applicat ion firewall that can 
offer proxy  detection and blocking when configured to 
detect GeoIP country code mismatches between the IP 
address of the final host connecting to a web server 
and the first IP address listed in the X-Forwarded-For 
HTTP request header. This makes use of geolocation 
data through integration with geolocation databases 
such as MAXMIND. If an anonymous proxy is being 
used then the IP address of the host connecting to the 
server will be that of the proxies and this will clash 
with the IP address listed in the X-Forwarded-For 
header. However, as with IP2Proxy , this runs into the 
problem of anonymous proxy hosts choosing to 
remove the X-Forwarded-For header from the 
forwarded requests, leaving the firewall with just the 
proxy server’s IP address and nothing to compare it to.  
 
3.  Proxy Detection System 
 
Our system is a form of network-based intrusion 
detection system, developed specifically  to detect the 
use of anonymous proxy scripts in a business or 
corporate network environment. It will include a 
number of different components, each with a specific 
task to perform. These are IP geolocation, a method 
for getting around SSL encryption used by a growing 
number o f proxy  sites and a proxy  detection algorithm.  
Underlying these components  will be the capability to 
capture network packets in real time in a similar way  
to the packet analysis software Wireshark. IP 
geolocation will provide informat ion on where, 
geographically, network packets are coming from. 
This will be used to help detect the usage of an 
anonymous proxy by comparing the location data to 
an online database in a similar style to an IP b lock list. 
Depending on the location of the server that an 
anonymous proxy is running on, the network packets 
will be passed on for further analysis by the proxy 
detection system. 
The method for getting around SSL encryption that 
may be used by proxy sites will be bas ed on a 
penetration testing tool called sslstrip. It is a form of 
MITM attack that forces a user’s browser into 
communicat ing with an adversary in plain-text over 
HTTP. This is possible because many HTTPS sites are 
normally  accessed from a HTTP 302 red irect on a 
HTTP page. The connection is intercepted before the 
redirect can take place and modify it to redirect to the 
HTTP version of a site e.g. https://twitter.com would  
become http://twitter.com. The adversary then acts 
like a proxy and forwards the communicat ion on to the 
internet as normal, using either HTTP or HTTPS 
depending on what is being requested whilst 
maintaining the HTTP connection between user and 
adversary. The “adversary” in the case of this project 
would be the proxy detection system in an attempt to 
gain access to encrypted network packets that are 
being sent to and from anonymous proxies for deeper 
analysis of their contents. The proxy detection will be 
the last part in this sequence. This will be the part of 
the system that will perform the analysis of suspicious 
network packets. The analysis will be based on the 
patterns of proxy  traffic d iscussed above. The patterns 
will be included in  a comparison as a rule base for the 
system. The system will compare network packets that 
are captured with the rules in real t ime. If an  
anonymising proxy is detected then the system will 
create a log of the detection that includes the packet 
that was analysed and the time and date it was 
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captured. An alert to the network administrator will 
also be sent to inform them of the detection. 
 
3.1. System Design  
 
This system will monitor a network by capturing 
packets as they go to and from the network and 
comparing the contents of the packets against a set of 
rules. Fig. 4 shows the architecture of the network for 
the proxy detection system. The system is located 
between 2 firewalls; one controlling access to and 
from the internet and another controlling access to the 
innermost network where the client machines reside. 
This creates an area known as a Demilitarised Zone 
(DMZ) which is a subnetwork that provides an 
additional layer of security to a network, separating a 
business’ local intranet from the wider Internet. Th is is 
known as the perimeter of the network.  
 
 
Figure 4. Network architecture 
 
Fig. 5 shows the sequence of interactions between the 
individual components of the system including the 
interaction between the client and network admin. The 
case shown in fig. 5 is a user attempting to use an 
anonymising proxy to access a website. In this case 
the system will use all three components to analyse 
and identify behaviours belonging to the proxy traffic 
and notify the network administrator about the proxy  
usage. 
 
 
Figure 5. Sequence Interaction diagram 
 
 
 
 
3.2.   Software Analysis 
 
Potential software tools are being investigated for 
the development of the proxy detection system. These 
tools include the general programming language 
Python as well as the network penetration testing tool 
sslstrip. Python is supported on both Windows and 
Unix-like based systems which means that the system 
will not be dependent on a single operating system. It  
also has generous support for packet snuffing and 
capture through the inclusion of the Scapy or Libpcap 
lib raries. 
SSL stripping is a concept that was developed by 
Moxie Marlinspike in 2009. It is a form of man in the 
middle attack that allows an attacker to prevent a web 
browser from upgrading an unencrypted HTTP 
connection to a HTTPS connection that is encrypted 
using SSL or TLS. He developed the tool sslstrip that 
was previously discussed above. The idea behind 
sslstrip is that users only encountered SSL in one of 
two ways, they either clicked on a hyperlink such as a 
login button or through a HTTP 302 redirect. What 
happens with the 302 red irect is a user will usually not 
type the “https://” prefix into the URL address bar. 
Instead they will type in “website.com” which the 
browser will automatically  interpret  as a request for 
“http://www.website.com”. If the website being 
requested only normally runs on HTTPS then the web 
server of the site will reply to the HTTP request with 
the 302 redirect code, telling the users browser to 
request the HTTPS URL instead. Fig. 6 shows what 
this looks like in the network analysis tool Wireshark. 
The website requested normally runs on HTTPS as it  
contains a login form, however the URL request 
defaulted to HTTP. Therefore the web server sent a 
redirect telling the browser to instead request the 
HTTPS version of the website.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. HTTP GET request for a website followed 
immediately by a 302 redirect 
 
What sslstrip does is it watches HTTP t raffic on a 
network and whenever it detects “https://” in a URL 
request, it intercepts the communication and changes 
it to “http://”. Whenever such a connection is detected, 
sslstrip will then init iate a SSL connection to the 
desired server and then forwards on the request as 
normal as if nothing had changed. This way the server 
never knows that the connection is being forwarded by 
sslstrip. Everything that is passed along through this 
connection can be read and logged in an unencrypted 
format. Incorporating this into the proxy detection 
system should theoretically allow for network packets 
being captured by the system to be in an unencrypted 
format and for the packets to appear normal outside of 
the system. This would allow the system to apply its 
proxy detection techniques to proxy packets that 
would normally be encrypted and unreadable. 
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4.  Conclusion 
The majority of current methods for detecting and 
blocking proxies rely  on variab les that can be changed 
very easily such as URL addresses and IP addresses. 
The method proposed aims at using the contents of the 
network packets and the format of the URL generated 
by an anonymising proxy  as the foundations for a rule 
base to be used to reliably and accurately detect 
whenever a proxy  has been used. Then adaptive 
learning techniques will be applied to classify network 
traffic and identify its origin. Any proxy traffic 
identified using this approach will be added to the rule 
base by the system. This research will also attempt to 
address the problem of anonymous proxies using 
encryption through the incorporation of the existing 
tool sslstrip, which will provide access to unencrypted 
packets to the detection system.  
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